As with most uses of air power through history, the strikes against ISIL have great potential for failure and they come with significant risk attached to them.
It is almost certain that innocent people will be wounded and killed in such a campaign. It is also highly likely that the destruction of infrastructure and the perceived selectiveness of the air strikes will probably result in the accumulation of grievances against the coalition.
These circumstances provide fertile ground for what comes after the strikes. With little ground capability, and even less ability to provide security and services to local populations, the strikes could potentially backfire. They could even contribute to ISIL maintaining its popularity.
It is important to remember than even 13 years after the US launched a similar air campaign, it continues to fight the Taliban in their Afghan heartland.
There, in 2006, the Taliban was almost annihilated, but was slowly allowed to regenerate in the years that followed.
It is easy to believe that the “remote” war that the coalition is waging against ISIL will produce similar results.
As many analysts have already noted, the success of the current campaign will rest on the coalition’s post-air strike ability to motivate local populations into turning away from ISIL and on being able to establish an inclusive political process.
The process of rebuilding a state that is, in the opinion of the public it seeks to represent, superior to the so-called “Islamic State” will be the main challenge.
This is potentially very difficult to pull off, especially with an existing Syrian and Iraqi Sunni disenfranchisement from the state as well as from other non-state entities.
The goal of providing security to local populations, and replacing a so-called state will be difficult, as both infrastructure and revenues continue to dwindle in the face of a continuing cycle of violence.
A strong and significant local ground presence – lacking in Iraq and unthinkable in Syria – will be vital to providing initial security to the areas that are controlled by ISIL once the organisation is rolled back.
It will be crucial too to regaining control of resources previously controlled by the Iraqi and Syrian states, such as the oilfields that ISIL has been exploiting for its operational revenues.
Also vital to crushing ISIL will be the resumption of border control operations, which will at the very least require the recapture of territories in northern Iraq from ISIL and rigorous policing of the Turkish border with Syria and Iraq, as well as establishing, with foreign support, new border security capabilities.
But it is hard to be optimistic about what the future holds.
The absence of a conclusion to the conflict in Syria and the lack of partners on the ground, combined with the historical incapability of the Iraqi government to provide even the most basic services to its Sunni population, makes the execution of a complex counterinsurgency and state-building campaigns seem beyond the reach of both countries.
Going back to the example of Afghanistan, even when a formidable foreign partner was involved in capacity building on the ground, the realities of building this capacity in a failed state, in competition with popular extremist Islamist movements, makes it a daunting if not impossible task.
Ahmed Al Attar is a defence and security commentator based in Abu Dhabi
On Twitter: @AhmedwAlAttar