About 11pm on Sunday, 10 armed men clad in uniforms penetrated the least well-defended portion of Karachi airport – the old airport. Security forces were quick to react but it still took five hours to clear the area. The attack resulted in dozens dead, including the attackers, an equal number injured and, although this has been denied by officials, some slight damage to some aircraft.
The attackers spoke Pashto but have been identified as foreigners. They were heavily armed with rocket launchers, grenades, plenty of ammunition, plus dried fruit and other edibles. This points to two thoughts: that they had planned on a raid lasting days rather than hours, and that they could not have carried all this weaponry and other supplies in at the time of the attack. They either had inside help or had managed to smuggle in additional weapons in advance.
Obviously, it was meticulously planned and ingeniously executed. From their targeting of aircraft in hangars, it may be concluded that their aim was more malicious than first appears.
The weapons and ammunition were of Indian origin. While this does not necessarily indicate official Indian involvement, it certainly adds to the possibility of external support. Since the target was chosen to do damage to Pakistan's image internationally, and also result in financial loss, the possibility of external involvement increases.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has quickly claimed responsibility, but this is insufficient to settle the matter. The TTP will claim any and every attack to add to its reputation, particularly at a time when it appears weakened by its divisiveness. Secondly, the TTP is also for sale. So long as it is terrorising Pakistanis, it can afford to target sensitive areas that it might be paid to hit.
Security has certainly been lax at Karachi airport, and intelligence agencies had warned of a potential attack, but it is unfair to blame airport security authorities exclusively. Intelligence warnings are graded according to source and reliability, and nobody yet knows how high (or low) this warning was graded.
If all security agencies reacted to each warning, the country would come to a standstill. Terrorists would no longer need to attack anywhere; a mere warning of the possibility of an attack would suffice.
As happens all over the world, the stable door will now be closed, a little too late. All airports need far better technologically advanced security measures. Just as September 11, 2001 alerted the United States to such threats, so this will, I hope, awaken other governments to the security requirements of sensitive locations. Heat and audio sensors, laser detectors and mobile patrols are basic requirements in this day and age. However, I fear that the heads that will roll will not be those that are responsible. As is usually the case, scapegoats will suffice.
The swift response of security forces, their courage and their determination are to be lauded. Regretfully, these are insufficient in the absence of a holistic national strategy.
As if to prove the intransigence of terrorists, the attack on Karachi did not end at the airport. On Tuesday, around midday, there was an attack on the Airport Security Force Academy, adjacent to the scene of Sunday night's attack.
Reports are conflicting. Some sources indicate that eight to 10 militants penetrated the courtyard and held academy staff hostage with their firepower from the perimeter. Other reports say that only two militants fired on the academy and fled. The latter has since been confirmed. No injuries have been reported.
While the government appears to have no strategy, the terrorists not only have a relentless strategy, they also have contingency plans.
I have always held that counter insurgency is a function of governance and that the military is merely one small component. However, in a situation such as the one in Pakistan, it is impossible to negotiate peace until the TTP is brought to a position of weakness by the use of force.
The irony is that in all the disturbed and insecure areas of Pakistan, the army is responsible for providing all the components of "good governance". It constructs lines of communication, educational institutions and health facilities, facilitates economic growth and attempts to enforce the writ of law.
And yet, because the political leadership refuses to take ownership of the necessary component of the use of force, there is still no comprehensive strategy. Pakistan's elected leaders continue playing the ostrich. Security forces, even with good intelligence, cannot succeed on their own.
Good governance, even if provided by the army, has to involve both reward and punishment. While the army can provide this, it cannot make good governance conditional, unless the government is prepared to hand over all troubled areas to the military.
This must be the final warning. Governments, central and provincial, will either have to govern – that is, take hard decisions and accept responsibility for them – or, they will have to decide who they cede the responsibility for insecure areas to: the TTP or the army.
Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer