A demonstration flight over Istanbul's Hagia Sophia in Istanbul last month. Ankara’s rhetoric-action divergence is something of a pattern. AFP
A demonstration flight over Istanbul's Hagia Sophia in Istanbul last month. Ankara’s rhetoric-action divergence is something of a pattern. AFP
A demonstration flight over Istanbul's Hagia Sophia in Istanbul last month. Ankara’s rhetoric-action divergence is something of a pattern. AFP
A demonstration flight over Istanbul's Hagia Sophia in Istanbul last month. Ankara’s rhetoric-action divergence is something of a pattern. AFP


Turkey seeks Brics membership, but its western allies shouldn't be worried


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September 13, 2024

Last week, Turkey’s application to join the Brics grouping set off another round of commentary that the country was indeed “moving away from the West”. For a number of reasons, however, there is less to this latest move than meets the eye.

One reason pertains to the limitations of Brics itself.

The grouping was set up in 2009-10 simply as a co-operation mechanism for the world’s primary “emerging” economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Of course, there was a political dimension to Brics when it was first set up – it was intended to rival the G7, a bloc of the most advanced economies (and democracies) in the world, led by the US. This year, Brics – increasingly viewed as a platform for countries not considered part of the West – invited Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to become members.

As such, superficially, it is understandable that Turkey’s desire to join Brics was interpreted as another attempt by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to step away from Ankara’s traditional western allies and Nato. The first problem with this view is that Brics membership is in large part symbolic, albeit with some tangible benefits. Unlike Nato, which binds Turkey by treaty to the collective defence obligations that it has made good on, from Afghanistan to the Korean Peninsula, Ankara is not committed to any such thing by becoming part of Brics.

It’s often been said about Brics that it doesn’t have a clearly defined, or unified, goal. Only some members share a strategic vision to balance American influence around the world, while a few others are either in direct competition, or have strong disagreements, with one another.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a summit with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv on Wednesday. Ankara is hedging its bets with regard to the Ukraine war. PA
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a summit with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv on Wednesday. Ankara is hedging its bets with regard to the Ukraine war. PA
It is notable that Russia has said that Brics will press pause on its bid to add new members

Even as the group is expanding, equity funds that invest in member countries are reportedly disappearing. After the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the subsequent sanctions, companies with Brics equity funds have been aiming to limit their exposure rather than getting deeper into some member markets.

Symbolism is important in geopolitics, of course, but even here things are more ambiguous than they appear.

At a time when Turkey’s trade with Russia is on the decline, it is notable that Moscow – which currently holds the Brics rotating presidency – has said that the grouping will press pause on its bid to add new members. Ankara, meanwhile, has signed a deal with the UK-based Shell corporation to tap the Sakarya gas field that Turkey discovered in the Black Sea, with an aim to increase domestic energy production and export natural gas to Europe.

This deal strikes at Russia’s ability to put pressure on Nato and EU member countries, which is significant. It’s important to remember that major European states, including France, remain heavily dependent on Russian gas – a notable factor restraining the West’s ability to inflict even greater economic pain on Moscow over the Ukraine war.

Ankara’s rhetoric-action divergence is something of a pattern. Mr Erdogan has been less forceful in his language over Russia’s role in the war, but Ankara’s material support to Ukraine from immediately after the invasion made a real difference, notably with the Bayraktar drones. Earlier this year, Turkey started building a factory near Kyiv to manufacture these weapons, one of very few foreign projects to assist indigenous Ukrainian military capacity.

A Brics meeting in Saint Petersburg, Russia, this week. Will Turkey get a seat at the table? AP
A Brics meeting in Saint Petersburg, Russia, this week. Will Turkey get a seat at the table? AP

The same ambivalence applies over Syria, where Turkish and western interests are in direct conflict with each other. The US-led anti-ISIS coalition is partnered with the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-led group that Ankara claims is an integral part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the foremost security threat within Turkey and a listed terrorist organisation in most western countries. Today, the SDF controls nearly a third of Syria, protected by American troops. In 2019, Mr Erdogan convinced then US president Donald Trump to cede a part of this territory along Turkey’s border to Turkish troops, and in theory Ankara wants a full US withdrawal.

In private, however, Turkish officials are wary of a US departure because this will effectively eliminate a buffer against Russia. The Syrian government, backed by Russia and Iran, will almost certainly displace the SDF, bringing these forces right up to Turkey’s borders and possibly threatening Ankara’s influence inside Syria. As for the PKK, it might consider reverting to its origins as a proxy for Moscow, which the Turkish government would not want.

It is in this framework of hedging that Turkey has applied to join Brics, assessing any cost to be worthwhile, just to be present in multilateral settings where there are potential benefits.

With Turkey’s economy having tripled in size under the Erdogan-led AKP since 2002, the country has the heft to act independently, rather than automatically follow America’s lead. Yet vulnerabilities remain, such as its exclusion from various western-made weapons systems as well as economic coercion from US sanctions. It is to offset these vulnerabilities – and not to turn away from Nato – that Ankara has looked to diversify its relations.

It is a balancing act similar to that of the latter-phase Ottoman Empire, playing foreign powers off each other to secure its interests and room for manoeuvre, while clearly being enmeshed far more with the West than Russia. There is little new under the Sun.

Sheer grandeur

The Owo building is 14 storeys high, seven of which are below ground, with the 30,000 square feet of amenities located subterranean, including a 16-seat private cinema, seven lounges, a gym, games room, treatment suites and bicycle storage.

A clear distinction between the residences and the Raffles hotel with the amenities operated separately.

BUNDESLIGA FIXTURES

Saturday, May 16 (kick-offs UAE time)

Borussia Dortmund v Schalke (4.30pm) 
RB Leipzig v Freiburg (4.30pm) 
Hoffenheim v Hertha Berlin (4.30pm) 
Fortuna Dusseldorf v Paderborn  (4.30pm) 
Augsburg v Wolfsburg (4.30pm) 
Eintracht Frankfurt v Borussia Monchengladbach (7.30pm)

Sunday, May 17

Cologne v Mainz (4.30pm),
Union Berlin v Bayern Munich (7pm)

Monday, May 18

Werder Bremen v Bayer Leverkusen (9.30pm)

Ten tax points to be aware of in 2026

1. Domestic VAT refund amendments: request your refund within five years

If a business does not apply for the refund on time, they lose their credit.

2. E-invoicing in the UAE

Businesses should continue preparing for the implementation of e-invoicing in the UAE, with 2026 a preparation and transition period ahead of phased mandatory adoption. 

3. More tax audits

Tax authorities are increasingly using data already available across multiple filings to identify audit risks. 

4. More beneficial VAT and excise tax penalty regime

Tax disputes are expected to become more frequent and more structured, with clearer administrative objection and appeal processes. The UAE has adopted a new penalty regime for VAT and excise disputes, which now mirrors the penalty regime for corporate tax.

5. Greater emphasis on statutory audit

There is a greater need for the accuracy of financial statements. The International Financial Reporting Standards standards need to be strictly adhered to and, as a result, the quality of the audits will need to increase.

6. Further transfer pricing enforcement

Transfer pricing enforcement, which refers to the practice of establishing prices for internal transactions between related entities, is expected to broaden in scope. The UAE will shortly open the possibility to negotiate advance pricing agreements, or essentially rulings for transfer pricing purposes. 

7. Limited time periods for audits

Recent amendments also introduce a default five-year limitation period for tax audits and assessments, subject to specific statutory exceptions. While the standard audit and assessment period is five years, this may be extended to up to 15 years in cases involving fraud or tax evasion. 

8. Pillar 2 implementation 

Many multinational groups will begin to feel the practical effect of the Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT), the UAE's implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax under Pillar 2. While the rules apply for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2025, it is 2026 that marks the transition to an operational phase.

9. Reduced compliance obligations for imported goods and services

Businesses that apply the reverse-charge mechanism for VAT purposes in the UAE may benefit from reduced compliance obligations. 

10. Substance and CbC reporting focus

Tax authorities are expected to continue strengthening the enforcement of economic substance and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting frameworks. In the UAE, these regimes are increasingly being used as risk-assessment tools, providing tax authorities with a comprehensive view of multinational groups’ global footprints and enabling them to assess whether profits are aligned with real economic activity. 

Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer

Avatar: Fire and Ash

Director: James Cameron

Starring: Sam Worthington, Sigourney Weaver, Zoe Saldana

Rating: 4.5/5

Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.

Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.

Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.

Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.

“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.

Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.

From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.

Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.

BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.

Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.

Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.

“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.

Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.

“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.

“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”

The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”

Key figures in the life of the fort

Sheikh Dhiyab bin Isa (ruled 1761-1793) Built Qasr Al Hosn as a watchtower to guard over the only freshwater well on Abu Dhabi island.

Sheikh Shakhbut bin Dhiyab (ruled 1793-1816) Expanded the tower into a small fort and transferred his ruling place of residence from Liwa Oasis to the fort on the island.

Sheikh Tahnoon bin Shakhbut (ruled 1818-1833) Expanded Qasr Al Hosn further as Abu Dhabi grew from a small village of palm huts to a town of more than 5,000 inhabitants.

Sheikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut (ruled 1833-1845) Repaired and fortified the fort.

Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon (ruled 1845-1855) Turned Qasr Al Hosn into a strong two-storied structure.

Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifa (ruled 1855-1909) Expanded Qasr Al Hosn further to reflect the emirate's increasing prominence.

Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (ruled 1928-1966) Renovated and enlarged Qasr Al Hosn, adding a decorative arch and two new villas.

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan (ruled 1966-2004) Moved the royal residence to Al Manhal palace and kept his diwan at Qasr Al Hosn.

Sources: Jayanti Maitra, www.adach.ae

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Updated: September 13, 2024, 6:50 AM