Turkey seeks Brics membership, but its western allies shouldn't be worried

Last week, Turkey’s application to join the Brics grouping set off another round of commentary that the country was indeed “moving away from the West”. For a number of reasons, however, there is less to this latest move than meets the eye.

One reason pertains to the limitations of Brics itself.

The grouping was set up in 2009-10 simply as a co-operation mechanism for the world’s primary “emerging” economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Of course, there was a political dimension to Brics when it was first set up – it was intended to rival the G7, a bloc of the most advanced economies (and democracies) in the world, led by the US. This year, Brics – increasingly viewed as a platform for countries not considered part of the West – invited Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to become members.

As such, superficially, it is understandable that Turkey’s desire to join Brics was interpreted as another attempt by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to step away from Ankara’s traditional western allies and Nato. The first problem with this view is that Brics membership is in large part symbolic, albeit with some tangible benefits. Unlike Nato, which binds Turkey by treaty to the collective defence obligations that it has made good on, from Afghanistan to the Korean Peninsula, Ankara is not committed to any such thing by becoming part of Brics.

It’s often been said about Brics that it doesn’t have a clearly defined, or unified, goal. Only some members share a strategic vision to balance American influence around the world, while a few others are either in direct competition, or have strong disagreements, with one another.

Even as the group is expanding, equity funds that invest in member countries are reportedly disappearing. After the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the subsequent sanctions, companies with Brics equity funds have been aiming to limit their exposure rather than getting deeper into some member markets.

Symbolism is important in geopolitics, of course, but even here things are more ambiguous than they appear.

At a time when Turkey’s trade with Russia is on the decline, it is notable that Moscow – which currently holds the Brics rotating presidency – has said that the grouping will press pause on its bid to add new members. Ankara, meanwhile, has signed a deal with the UK-based Shell corporation to tap the Sakarya gas field that Turkey discovered in the Black Sea, with an aim to increase domestic energy production and export natural gas to Europe.

This deal strikes at Russia’s ability to put pressure on Nato and EU member countries, which is significant. It’s important to remember that major European states, including France, remain heavily dependent on Russian gas – a notable factor restraining the West’s ability to inflict even greater economic pain on Moscow over the Ukraine war.

Ankara’s rhetoric-action divergence is something of a pattern. Mr Erdogan has been less forceful in his language over Russia’s role in the war, but Ankara’s material support to Ukraine from immediately after the invasion made a real difference, notably with the Bayraktar drones. Earlier this year, Turkey started building a factory near Kyiv to manufacture these weapons, one of very few foreign projects to assist indigenous Ukrainian military capacity.

The same ambivalence applies over Syria, where Turkish and western interests are in direct conflict with each other. The US-led anti-ISIS coalition is partnered with the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-led group that Ankara claims is an integral part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the foremost security threat within Turkey and a listed terrorist organisation in most western countries. Today, the SDF controls nearly a third of Syria, protected by American troops. In 2019, Mr Erdogan convinced then US president Donald Trump to cede a part of this territory along Turkey’s border to Turkish troops, and in theory Ankara wants a full US withdrawal.

In private, however, Turkish officials are wary of a US departure because this will effectively eliminate a buffer against Russia. The Syrian government, backed by Russia and Iran, will almost certainly displace the SDF, bringing these forces right up to Turkey’s borders and possibly threatening Ankara’s influence inside Syria. As for the PKK, it might consider reverting to its origins as a proxy for Moscow, which the Turkish government would not want.

It is in this framework of hedging that Turkey has applied to join Brics, assessing any cost to be worthwhile, just to be present in multilateral settings where there are potential benefits.

With Turkey’s economy having tripled in size under the Erdogan-led AKP since 2002, the country has the heft to act independently, rather than automatically follow America’s lead. Yet vulnerabilities remain, such as its exclusion from various western-made weapons systems as well as economic coercion from US sanctions. It is to offset these vulnerabilities – and not to turn away from Nato – that Ankara has looked to diversify its relations.

It is a balancing act similar to that of the latter-phase Ottoman Empire, playing foreign powers off each other to secure its interests and room for manoeuvre, while clearly being enmeshed far more with the West than Russia. There is little new under the Sun.