Borhan Osman is an analyst with the Kabul-based Afghanistan Analysts Network. He explains how the Taliban persists as the main threat to the Afghan government and describes the difference between the group in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Follow him on Twitter: @Borhan
What specific groups are the main security threats facing Afghanistan now?
There are currently two types of armed actors threatening security and state stability in Afghanistan. One is a relatively well-organised insurgency and another is the warlords and armed groups who challenge the authority of the central government and are responsible for insecurity in parts of the country.
In the insurgency, the groups representing it are specific and knowable. The landscape of insurgency in Afghanistan is characterised by a lack of multiplicity, unlike most other recent or current conflicts where you have myriad of militant groups with deeply diverse agendas and differences, such as during the Iraq insurgency or the current situation in Pakistan and Syria. When we speak of insurgency in Afghanistan, we talk mainly of one group, which is the Taliban. There are other groups as well, such as the Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, but its role has been largely confined to militant rhetoric and is less visible on the battlefield. So, in the insurgency, the Taliban pose the biggest threat to the government.
However, speaking broadly of security threats, the Taliban does not have the monopoly. There are also warlords and local armed groups in different parts of the country in various licit, semi-licit and illicit forms, whose threat to security is of no lesser scale than the Taliban.
How do you define the Taliban? Do you believe that some groups that are anti-state get lumped into what has become a very wide term (Taliban)?
The Taliban is a rather close-knit group and it is difficult to find distinct entities within it. Yes, on the very local level, you might feel there are different groups, sometimes following different chains of command, but that difference will disappear as you get to a higher level. If the Taliban were different groups united by a common enemy, you most likely would have seen some splits. But there has been no single successful split over the Taliban’s decade-long insurgency. Any attempt at breaking away has led to isolation of the person or commander involved. Any such commander or leader, no matter how important their position was, once disowned by the central leadership, has become a pariah and alone. This stands in sharp contrast with the mujahideen factions during the 1980s and 1990s whose only glue was the presence of Soviet troops and their allied regime in Kabul. Once, the common enemy was gone, the various factions started fighting each other.
Basically, the mujahideen were divided from the very beginning. And the Taliban are not like the mujahideen who were made of different groups with no central command. The Taliban had managed to establish a well-centralised form of government in over 90 per cent of Afghanistan before they were toppled in late 2001. Although the group is now running an insurgency, the cause, the leader, the philosophy of obedience and most importantly the political vision have not changed. So, you don’t really see distinct groups inside the Taliban. You don’t feel there are different ideologies or different modus operandi to establishing the envisioned Islamic government among the Taliban.
What is the role of militants known from the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqani network?
Hekmatyar is leading his own insurgent group, which is not comparable with the Taliban. Most of his Soviet-war era comrades have integrated into the government, leaving him without many men to do the fighting. He is not seen as a major player in the current insurgency. The presence of his group has been limited to certain areas in a few provinces. Hekmatyar has always kept a distance from the Taliban, and even used a hostile tone towards it during both the Taliban’s government era and the current insurgency.
Regarding the so-called Haqqani Network, it has never been a separate entity different from the Taliban. The leader of the network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, was an active minister during the Taliban’s government and has remained an important part of the movement during the insurgency. The ‘network’ has played a significant role in the post-2001 campaign against the foreign troops and the new government. So, it has been an integral part of the Taliban, nonetheless western media and officials’ tend to brand it as a separate group. What has probably led to this view is the ‘network’s’ operational and financial semi-autonomy, which has probably helped it be more effective.
What is the connection between the Pakistani Taliban and the Taliban fighting the Afghan government? How would you differentiate them?
While the phenomenon of the Afghan Taliban is now two decades old, what is called the Pakistani Taliban is a newer phenomenon. It emerged after the Afghan Taliban kicked off their fight against the US-led coalition forces. Inspired by the Afghan Taliban, their Pakistani counterparts entertain almost the same goal, of enforcing sharia in Pakistan, but they have followed various agendas over different times: from supporting their Afghan counterparts in the battle against foreign forces to establishing an Islamic system in Pakistan. However, the Pakistani Taliban is distinct: their tactics and the rigidity of their tactics, their more extremist militant ideology, and their loose structure make them more a separate entity from the Afghan Taliban.
On the Pakistan side, the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan umbrella organisation’s leaders have publicly sworn allegiance to the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar. Also, the Pakistani Taliban does not hide its presence in Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. Indeed, the main goal of the Pakistani Taliban initially was to fight alongside its Afghan counterparts in Afghanistan. But the goals shifted gradually after the Pakistani government launched a series of campaigns against it. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban have been reluctant to be seen as associated with the Pakistani Taliban. This reluctance is partially due to the fact that the Afghan Taliban does not want to upset the Pakistani government, who are seen to have allowed them use Pakistan as their shelter.
foreign.desk@thenational.ae
The biog
Birthday: February 22, 1956
Born: Madahha near Chittagong, Bangladesh
Arrived in UAE: 1978
Exercise: At least one hour a day on the Corniche, from 5.30-6am and 7pm to 8pm.
Favourite place in Abu Dhabi? “Everywhere. Wherever you go, you can relax.”
Company%20Profile
%3Cp%3E%3Cstrong%3ECompany%20name%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3ENamara%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EStarted%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EJune%202022%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EFounder%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EMohammed%20Alnamara%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EBased%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EDubai%20%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3ESector%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EMicrofinance%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3ECurrent%20number%20of%20staff%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3E16%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestment%20stage%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3ESeries%20A%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestors%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EFamily%20offices%0D%3Cbr%3E%3C%2Fp%3E%0A
Company%20profile
%3Cp%3E%3Cstrong%3ECompany%20name%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Fasset%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EStarted%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3E2019%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EFounders%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Mohammad%20Raafi%20Hossain%2C%20Daniel%20Ahmed%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EBased%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Dubai%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3ESector%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EFinTech%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInitial%20investment%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20%242.45%20million%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3ECurrent%20number%20of%20staff%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%2086%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestment%20stage%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Pre-series%20B%0D%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestors%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Investcorp%2C%20Liberty%20City%20Ventures%2C%20Fatima%20Gobi%20Ventures%2C%20Primal%20Capital%2C%20Wealthwell%20Ventures%2C%20FHS%20Capital%2C%20VN2%20Capital%2C%20local%20family%20offices%3C%2Fp%3E%0A
Wicked
Director: Jon M Chu
Stars: Cynthia Erivo, Ariana Grande, Jonathan Bailey
Company%20Profile
%3Cp%3E%3Cstrong%3ECompany%20name%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Hoopla%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EDate%20started%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EMarch%202023%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EFounder%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Jacqueline%20Perrottet%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EBased%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Dubai%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3ENumber%20of%20staff%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%2010%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestment%20stage%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EPre-seed%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestment%20required%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20%24500%2C000%3C%2Fp%3E%0A
COMPANY%20PROFILE%20
%3Cp%3E%3Cstrong%3ECompany%20name%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EAlmouneer%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EStarted%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%202017%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EFounders%3A%3C%2Fstrong%3E%20Dr%20Noha%20Khater%20and%20Rania%20Kadry%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EBased%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EEgypt%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3ENumber%20of%20staff%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3E120%3Cbr%3E%3Cstrong%3EInvestment%3A%20%3C%2Fstrong%3EBootstrapped%2C%20with%20support%20from%20Insead%20and%20Egyptian%20government%2C%20seed%20round%20of%20%3Cbr%3E%243.6%20million%20led%20by%20Global%20Ventures%3Cbr%3E%3C%2Fp%3E%0A
Business Insights
- As per the document, there are six filing options, including choosing to report on a realisation basis and transitional rules for pre-tax period gains or losses.
- SMEs with revenue below Dh3 million per annum can opt for transitional relief until 2026, treating them as having no taxable income.
- Larger entities have specific provisions for asset and liability movements, business restructuring, and handling foreign permanent establishments.
India squad
Virat Kohli (captain), Rohit Sharma, Mayank Agarwal, K.L. Rahul, Shreyas Iyer, Manish Pandey, Rishabh Pant, Shivam Dube, Kedar Jadhav, Ravindra Jadeja, Yuzvendra Chahal, Kuldeep Yadav, Deepak Chahar, Mohammed Shami, Shardul Thakur.
Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
LEAGUE CUP QUARTER-FINAL DRAW
Stoke City v Tottenham
Brentford v Newcastle United
Arsenal v Manchester City
Everton v Manchester United
All ties are to be played the week commencing December 21.
EMILY%20IN%20PARIS%3A%20SEASON%203
%3Cp%3ECreated%20by%3A%20Darren%20Star%3C%2Fp%3E%0A%3Cp%3EStarring%3A%20Lily%20Collins%2C%20Philippine%20Leroy-Beaulieu%2C%20Ashley%20Park%3C%2Fp%3E%0A%3Cp%3ERating%3A%202.75%2F5%3C%2Fp%3E%0A
Business Insights
- Canada and Mexico are significant energy suppliers to the US, providing the majority of oil and natural gas imports
- The introduction of tariffs could hinder the US's clean energy initiatives by raising input costs for materials like nickel
- US domestic suppliers might benefit from higher prices, but overall oil consumption is expected to decrease due to elevated costs
Will the pound fall to parity with the dollar?
The idea of pound parity now seems less far-fetched as the risk grows that Britain may split away from the European Union without a deal.
Rupert Harrison, a fund manager at BlackRock, sees the risk of it falling to trade level with the dollar on a no-deal Brexit. The view echoes Morgan Stanley’s recent forecast that the currency can plunge toward $1 (Dh3.67) on such an outcome. That isn’t the majority view yet – a Bloomberg survey this month estimated the pound will slide to $1.10 should the UK exit the bloc without an agreement.
New Prime Minister Boris Johnson has repeatedly said that Britain will leave the EU on the October 31 deadline with or without an agreement, fuelling concern the nation is headed for a disorderly departure and fanning pessimism toward the pound. Sterling has fallen more than 7 per cent in the past three months, the worst performance among major developed-market currencies.
“The pound is at a much lower level now but I still think a no-deal exit would lead to significant volatility and we could be testing parity on a really bad outcome,” said Mr Harrison, who manages more than $10 billion in assets at BlackRock. “We will see this game of chicken continue through August and that’s likely negative for sterling,” he said about the deadlocked Brexit talks.
The pound fell 0.8 per cent to $1.2033 on Friday, its weakest closing level since the 1980s, after a report on the second quarter showed the UK economy shrank for the first time in six years. The data means it is likely the Bank of England will cut interest rates, according to Mizuho Bank.
The BOE said in November that the currency could fall even below $1 in an analysis on possible worst-case Brexit scenarios. Options-based calculations showed around a 6.4 per cent chance of pound-dollar parity in the next one year, markedly higher than 0.2 per cent in early March when prospects of a no-deal outcome were seemingly off the table.
Bloomberg
The specs
Engine: Direct injection 4-cylinder 1.4-litre
Power: 150hp
Torque: 250Nm
Price: From Dh139,000
On sale: Now
