What could a 'combat-capable' Gaza security force look like?

A “combat-capable force” made up of professional and well-equipped militaries from Arab and Muslim-majority countries could number up to 60,000 troops to secure Gaza, military experts have suggested.

They argue that a Nato-style contribution, involving the countries of the Arabian Gulf, would be capable of providing a robust force for the immediate postwar period. Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia are among countries expected to provide troops.

Command functions − which might include Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait and Qatar − will be key to the operation.

The presence of Muslim‑majority nations would assist the recovery as well as oversee the supplies of food and essentials needed to alleviate suffering in the area. “This also aligns with the view that this should be seen as a non‑occupying force,” said Burcu Ozcelik, of the London-based Royal United Services Institute think tank.

With that impartial infrastructure in place after the Israeli military stages a withdrawal – possibly as soon as the weekend – there would be a clear opportunity for the Palestinian Authority “to shore up its legitimacy in the future governance structure of Gaza”, according to Ms Ozcelik.

“A large, combat capable, chunky force with loads of serious combat power will be needed,” said Lynette Nusbacher, who served as a Nato intelligence officer in Kosovo. “Gulf Arab states have all got some of the best kit you could bring.”

Stabilisation force

Under US President Donald Trump’s 20‑point peace plan, section 15 highlights the need to develop a “temporary International Stabilisation Force to immediately deploy in Gaza”.

Troops would train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces and provide “the long‑term internal security solution”.

The plan states that it will also work with both Israel and Egypt to secure Gaza’s border and, critically, would prevent munitions entering while helping get in the rapid flow of goods needed to rebuild the territory.

The full plan has yet to be ratified by the Israelis but already Jordan and Egypt have been training up a Palestinian security force of about 5,000 that could potentially be used in conjunction with the first phase. These personnel would be needed to build up a local police service that can take over the stabilisation force’s responsibilities when they are ready.

“The important factor in all of this is that the local Palestinian population buys into this process so that we don't have pockets of insurgency popping up to threaten this stabilisation force,” said former British army officer Hamish de Bretton Gordon.

A key part of keeping the peace will be a Disarming Demobilisation and Reintegration programme to deal with the estimated 20,000 Hamas and allied fighters in Gaza.

Having a DDR process in place ensures combatants lay down their weapons, exit the military and return to civilian life. “These post conflict transitions are processes that must be under way at once,” said Ms Ozcelik. “It’s going to be incredibly complicated. For DDR to succeed you must disaggregate the most dangerous of Hamas versus the lower-level supporters who have not necessarily committed crimes but will need to be accommodated in the future of Gaza.”

A model for the security plan lies in the success of Nato's KFOR (Kosovo Force), which entered Kosovo in 1999. KFOR veterans suggested that, in time, some former Hamas fighters could be employed in a similar way to ex-Kosovo Liberation Army combatants who were given menial tasks but paid in western currency.

After a 78-day Nato bombing campaign against Serbian forces that had been fighting Kosovo’s predominantly Muslim population, KFOR was established in June 1999. Under a UN Security Council resolution, the force of 40,000 entered the territory stopping hostilities.

Since then, KFOR, which has included UAE troops, has managed to keep the peace and demilitarise the ethnic-Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army.

While the population numbers of Gaza and Kosovo are similar, the conflict over the last two years has wrought a greater toll with more than 67,000 dead, many wounded and a devastated landscape.

Ultimately, as in Kosovo, peace will only come by providing security and giving the youth of Gaza hope for the future. It will face possibly the most challenging environment an international stabilisation force has ever experienced, but military experts have told The National that it can also draw on the experience of the successful Kosovo deployment.

Officers who served on KFOR have argued that it provides a template for what will be required in Gaza, with a powerful military rapidly assembled.

“We started in Kosovo with a corps size force [approximately 60,000] and then built down as security improved,” said Ms Nusbacher.

The force strength will also need to take into account the lessons of the US and French militaries that suffered significant losses in Lebanon in 1982 as they lacked sufficient armaments, she added.

“This is a hugely challenging activity,” said Mr de Bretton Gordon, another KFOR veteran. “But Kosovo should be a template on how these things are done because Kosovo is really a great success story.”

Gaza security

The initial intervention force will need to be three divisions of about 60,000 personnel, organised under a worldwide rotation system and operating on six‑month rotations under a UN mandate.

Other primary aims would be to establish secure bases, start patrolling and create a quick reaction force to respond to attacks as well as securing the borders, preventing Hamas from rearming.

It would simultaneously have to deal with the civilian population that has been severely malnourished while restoring electricity and a clean water and sewage system.

The Israeli army will also be another factor, with success largely dependent on whether it impedes operations. “They're not going to make life easy for them,” said Frank Ledwidge, a former Royal Navy intelligence officer who served on KFOR. “While Gaza, unlike Kosovo, is flat it is small, so accommodating a big force will be hugely challenging.”

Arab force

The force would not go in with main battle tanks – something the Israelis would not allow – and wheeled armoured vehicles, equipped with 40mm cannons that are air-portable, will probably be their strongest defence.

Muslim armies

With a long history of peacekeeping missions, a competent military and a government willing to post them, Pakistan could make up a significant part of the force.

Indonesia has also offered 20,000 soldiers for Gaza and is also regarded as both competent and effective.

Ms Nusbacher argued that when the initial Arab insertion force had achieved a “steady state” the Pakistanis and Indonesians “might be really good for maintaining that” afterwards.

Western forces

Given initial western support for Israel, and the continued American assistance, the stabilisation force would have no visible footprint from the West. They would be a target and “would want to stay at some distance,” said Mr de Bretton Gordon.

But the West would probably provide signals and surveillance information as well as covert or discrete intelligence sharing by the US and UK.

This would include spy aircraft alongside hundreds of drones to watch over the area, and potentially some of these could be used and operated by Turkish forces at a distance.

Western humanitarian charities would play a significant role, however.

Rules of engagement

Once the stabilisation force is in place key will be how its troops respond to threats and attacks by those opposing their presence.

If they are too weak in their response – as the UN was in Bosnia that was in part responsible for the Srebrenica massacre of Muslims – then the force could be quickly be disregarded.

If they are too trigger-happy, then it would also lose credibility and probably generate an insurgency.

But to remain a potent force the rules of engagement would have to be “as robust as they can be,” said Ms Nusbacher.

Mr Ledwidge argued that authority to use lethal force should also be devolved to junior commanders known as “mission command”.

He believes that “the most important thing” was to have “a really strong presence that's very willing to use force”.