The US ambassador to Turkey and envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, returned to Beirut on Monday to hear what the Lebanese had to say about a proposal he had presented two weeks ago. Not long after his arrival, he declared he was “satisfied and grateful for the Lebanese response … We are developing a plan to move forward, and I feel very hopeful”.
Mr Barrack has taken over the Lebanon file momentarily following the departure of the previous envoy Morgan Ortagus. On June 19, he brought with him a plan outlining Hezbollah’s disarmament, which would lead to Israel’s withdrawal from hills it occupies in southern Lebanon. The proposal also covers economic and financial reform.
In the proposal, Lebanon and Israel would also move towards demarcation of their border, removing any excuse for continued resistance against Israel. The Israelis would release their Lebanese prisoners as well. In parallel, Lebanon had to implement reforms that ended the cash economy, restructured the banking sector and closed Hezbollah’s de-facto bank Al Qard Al Hassan as well as the money exchanges that help the party finance itself.
Lebanon and Syria would also be asked to improve ties and control their common border, which they would demarcate. This would clarify to whom the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms belong, and if the sides agreed that they are Syrian, as the UN has said, it would end Hezbollah’s justification for liberating the farms.
Mr Barrack also made it clear the demands were part of a broader package – one with Arab backing. If Lebanon failed to implement Hezbollah’s disarmament, it would not benefit from outside investment or aid to rebuild the country after the war last year. The Lebanese reply will now be used by Mr Barrack to help lay the groundwork for progress on the Lebanese-Israeli front, because the US feels that the mechanism put in place to consolidate the ceasefire negotiated last November is no longer working.
In public, Hezbollah has maintained a hard line, describing calls for its disarmament as an Israeli demand, backed by Washington, and insisting the future of its weapons had to be decided by the Lebanese. Its secretary general, Naim Qassem, stated last week: “We will address and agree internally to […] matters such as weapons and other issues.”
“Our weapons,” he added, “are there to confront Israel, and we will not surrender our right.” On Sunday, Mr Qassem said the party was ready for one of two choices: peace and the building of a state or confrontation. “But,” he said, “we will not surrender, nor will be compromise on our rights and dignity.”
Upon returning to Beirut, Mr Barrack sounded conciliatory when he said that there was “no deadline” for Hezbollah’s disarmament.
The US proposal put the Lebanese on the spot. While President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam seek a monopoly of the state over weapons – they have made this a stated goal of the Cabinet – they have moved slowly on disarming Hezbollah to avoid a potentially risky confrontation with the party. However, under US pressure they explicitly mentioned in their reply to Mr Barrack that the state alone must hold weapons, to which Hezbollah had to agree.
A major part of the problem is that, ultimately, any decision on Hezbollah’s weapons will be taken in Tehran, given that the party’s senior leadership was largely eliminated last year and Iran now has more central say in its affairs. Unconfirmed news reports have indicated that Mr Aoun recently brought up Hezbollah’s disarmament with a leading party official, and proposed that the state confiscate its rockets, but this was met with a refusal.
Publicly, at least, Hezbollah has sought to portray itself as flexible on its weapons. Not that it has had much choice. The party is isolated nationally and has no serious hopes of reviving a military strategy against Israel at present while remaining vulnerable to Israeli attacks. And it wants to avoid tensions with the Lebanese state. There have been unconfirmed reports, notably a July 4 story published by the news agency Reuters, that Hezbollah is discussing internally reducing its role as an armed group, even if this falls short of complete disarmament.
At the same time, the party does not want to be seen as surrendering its weapons under outside, especially US and Israeli, duress. Yet this potentially poses problems for Hezbollah. Lebanon’s President and government have staked their credibility on giving the state a monopoly over weapons, and the party’s reluctance to go along with this, or its desire to impose conditions on its disarmament, may well strain its ties with the state.
If the Americans and Israelis believe that the Lebanese state and Hezbollah are manoeuvring to buy time, it is a near certainty that Israel will escalate its military operations in Lebanon to impose its preferred outcome. The probability would rise if the fighting in Gaza is soon brought to an end. It also seems highly unlikely the US would support renewing the mandate of UN peacekeepers in the country in such a case, while a further lack of progress would mean no aid for reconstruction, let alone foreign investment in the country.
Mr Barrack’s initiative opens the door to a new phase, one in which Lebanon will soon have to offer a timetable for disarming Hezbollah. Mr Aoun and Mr Salam appear to agree in principle to do so, while Iran and the party are not there. Under these circumstances, the President and Prime Minister may sense, against their deeper preferences, that the only leverage that might change Hezbollah’s mind is that provided by their sworn enemy.
