US Secretary of State John Kerry kicks a football around during an airplane refuelling stop on Sal Island in Cape Verde, enroute to Washington DC (REUTERS/Saul Loeb)
US Secretary of State John Kerry kicks a football around during an airplane refuelling stop on Sal Island in Cape Verde, enroute to Washington DC (REUTERS/Saul Loeb)
US Secretary of State John Kerry kicks a football around during an airplane refuelling stop on Sal Island in Cape Verde, enroute to Washington DC (REUTERS/Saul Loeb)
US Secretary of State John Kerry kicks a football around during an airplane refuelling stop on Sal Island in Cape Verde, enroute to Washington DC (REUTERS/Saul Loeb)

An absent America is the worst of all possible worlds


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Did he or didn’t he say it? Ever since America’s secretary of state John Kerry gave an interview about the Syrian conflict on Sunday, Washington has been trying to qualify and explain his comments.

Speaking to a US TV network, Mr Kerry said: “We have to negotiate in the end.” That was translated as either a capitulation to Bashar Al Assad, a recognition of the reality of the conflict or an unwise tipping of America’s negotiating hand.

It was, of course, nothing of the sort, as the next sentence from Mr Kerry revealed: “And what we’re pushing for is to get him to come and do that, and it may require that there be increased pressure on him of various kinds in order to do that.”

That was also misinterpreted – was Mr Kerry suggesting he would speak directly to Mr Al Assad? The State Department later clarified, no.

So no change, then, in US policy. Mr Al Assad must still go, he must go as part of a political transition and the best way to persuade him to go is to put unspecified pressure on him.

As anyone will know who has even vaguely followed the contortions of the Syrian civil war – which has now entered its fifth year – US and western policy over Syria has been not merely ineffective; it has been a catastrophe. America has been involved in some way in the Syrian civil war for almost as long as it was involved in the Second World War.

The flip-flopping in Washington over Mr Kerry’s remarks reflects a broader flip-flopping in US policy towards Syria. Western policy has failed Syria – and it has failed on America’s watch.

Already, one can hear the chorus of criticism that rises whenever the Middle East criticises America for not doing enough. Why does the region always expect America to get involved? Let the region, so the argument runs, sort out its own problems.

That argument would be fine were it not for the realities of history and power. The status quo was not brought about by the Arabs alone, nor are the Arabs alone in demanding American action. America did not ask permission when it invaded Iraq in 2003 – and the consequences of that war have been felt by the Arabs, first and foremost.

Recall, too, that it was Israel’s president who stood before America’s Congress this month and demanded America do what he was unwilling to do himself.

Moreover, the US cannot simply walk away from the Middle East, not after spending so many years backing Israel militarily, invading Iraq, sanctioning Iran – to say nothing of all the covert deals and operations. History did not begin on 9/11, or with the Iraq invasion or during this phase of the Syrian crisis.

Indeed, on Syria specifically, America not only refused to get involved but also restrained the Middle East from seeking to solve the issue: Washington has both declined to offer the Syrian rebels the portable anti-aircraft missiles they have been asking for for three years, and stopped Turkey and regional allies providing them.

A more realistic position is that, for better or worse, the US is heavily involved in the region and will be for some time to come. The question, then, is not about whether the US is involved in the Middle East, but what shape that involvement takes.

American involvement, delivered properly, is broadly a good thing for the region. America’s military and diplomatic weight is unrivalled and it can still do some things that no one else, including countries in the region, can do.

But America is today, at best, an absent-minded ally. Washington seeks to influence in some areas – extensively in Iraq and Iran, to a lesser extent in Lebanon – but then also wants to step back from tricky challenges such as Syria and Yemen. Half involved and half afraid, America is too often a fair weather friend.

That is neither a coherent nor effective policy. While America flirts with leaving the Middle East, other countries are seeking to fill the gap, from Russia to Iran. In this middle moment between too much engagement and none at all, new alliances are being forged – but those alliances cost time, effort and money.

Countries in the Middle East, and especially in the Gulf, have spent too much political energy and financial capital on their relationship with the US. America owes the region some loyalty.

The worst reality for the Middle East is the one it is living: a disengaged America with one foot out of the door.

falyafai@thenational.ae

On Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai

Ten tax points to be aware of in 2026

1. Domestic VAT refund amendments: request your refund within five years

If a business does not apply for the refund on time, they lose their credit.

2. E-invoicing in the UAE

Businesses should continue preparing for the implementation of e-invoicing in the UAE, with 2026 a preparation and transition period ahead of phased mandatory adoption. 

3. More tax audits

Tax authorities are increasingly using data already available across multiple filings to identify audit risks. 

4. More beneficial VAT and excise tax penalty regime

Tax disputes are expected to become more frequent and more structured, with clearer administrative objection and appeal processes. The UAE has adopted a new penalty regime for VAT and excise disputes, which now mirrors the penalty regime for corporate tax.

5. Greater emphasis on statutory audit

There is a greater need for the accuracy of financial statements. The International Financial Reporting Standards standards need to be strictly adhered to and, as a result, the quality of the audits will need to increase.

6. Further transfer pricing enforcement

Transfer pricing enforcement, which refers to the practice of establishing prices for internal transactions between related entities, is expected to broaden in scope. The UAE will shortly open the possibility to negotiate advance pricing agreements, or essentially rulings for transfer pricing purposes. 

7. Limited time periods for audits

Recent amendments also introduce a default five-year limitation period for tax audits and assessments, subject to specific statutory exceptions. While the standard audit and assessment period is five years, this may be extended to up to 15 years in cases involving fraud or tax evasion. 

8. Pillar 2 implementation 

Many multinational groups will begin to feel the practical effect of the Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT), the UAE's implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax under Pillar 2. While the rules apply for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2025, it is 2026 that marks the transition to an operational phase.

9. Reduced compliance obligations for imported goods and services

Businesses that apply the reverse-charge mechanism for VAT purposes in the UAE may benefit from reduced compliance obligations. 

10. Substance and CbC reporting focus

Tax authorities are expected to continue strengthening the enforcement of economic substance and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting frameworks. In the UAE, these regimes are increasingly being used as risk-assessment tools, providing tax authorities with a comprehensive view of multinational groups’ global footprints and enabling them to assess whether profits are aligned with real economic activity. 

Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer