Why taming Hezbollah is in Iran’s interest

Does Iran have a compelling reason to agree for Hezbollah to be tamed? This would, after all, involve the Tehran-backed group transforming itself into an exclusively political party that relinquishes its weapons to the Lebanese army and allows the state to exercise authority over territory that is currently under its control. And this would entail the Islamic Republic abandoning its most critical regional tool of influence and reforming its core doctrine. The answer may be “yes” – for a few notable reasons. First, Iran faces a stark choice: to either preserve its nuclear weapons programme or maintain its regional proxies. If it insists on the latter, it risks exposing its nuclear facilities to military retaliation from Israel. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are an absolute priority for its leadership. The ball is in Iran’s court to revive negotiations with the US and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, which would ensure the protection of its nuclear facilities and the preservation of its ambition to maintain its “right” to nuclear development (although not necessarily to develop nuclear weapons). Tehran has apparently understood its military inferiority to Israel and recalibrated its priorities accordingly, returning to the policy drawing board. It has distanced itself from Hamas’s missteps and Hezbollah’s adventures, prioritising its national interests over its “Axis of Resistance” strategy. Second, Israel, with firm US support, has presented Tehran with a blunt ultimatum: either rein in Hezbollah or risk its military elimination. Tehran has little room for manoeuvre. It cannot provide direct military support to Hezbollah, nor can it protect the group from Israeli attacks on the ground or in its tunnel networks. In light of this, Iran has sought to present itself as a diplomatic and political facilitator, contributing to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and achieving a ceasefire. While its initial steps faltered, it ultimately realised that its interests required acknowledging the value of its influence in this pivotal moment. Today, its role in Lebanon is markedly different from in the past, prompting a re-evaluation of its calculations. Third, both US President Joe Biden and president-elect Donald Trump have agreed on two fundamental points regarding Iran: one, reviving nuclear negotiations with Tehran depends on the latter demonstrating goodwill through modifications in its regional behaviour; and two, Lebanon is the immediate test of Iran’s intentions. The Iranians initially expected Mr Trump to adopt an aggressive stance after his election, but they were surprised when he signalled a willingness to negotiate with them . Mr Trump, it seems, conveyed that genuine co-operation would yield significant rewards, while deception would result in severe sanctions and economic collapse. The president-elect, meanwhile, has reportedly thrown his support behind Mr Hochstein’s mission to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon. Strategically, Iran assigns great importance to improving relations with the incoming Trump administration, especially as it recognises its inability to rescue Hezbollah militarily. Tehran, therefore, has concluded that taming Hezbollah is preferable to witnessing its total annihilation. Accordingly, the group has in recent days adopted positions that have facilitated negotiations between Mr Hochstein and Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. It has expressed support for a presidential election in Lebanon, which is a departure from its earlier obstructionist policy. It has also stated its intention to abide by Lebanon’s post-civil war Constitution. This marks a significant shift in the group’s stance, as the Constitution emphasises the state’s sovereignty and the exclusive possession of arms by the state. These shifts may or may not reflect the true intentions of the group or its patrons in Tehran. However, the reality is that a degraded Hezbollah faces a choice: either elimination or acceptance of a role in Lebanon’s political landscape. If negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah succeed, the subsequent agreement will act as a mechanism for implementing Resolution 1701, which encompasses Resolution 1559. Together, these resolutions provide a roadmap for Lebanon’s recovery and its liberation from the grip of both Israel and Hezbollah. If and when both sides agree to a deal, Mr Hochstein will request them to commit in writing to the terms of the agreement by a specified date, marking the cessation of hostilities. From that point on, a 60-day period will begin, during which time the Lebanese army will be posted in the area between the border and the Litani River. A broader implementation monitoring committee – including Lebanon, Israel, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon , the US and France – will oversee the execution process. A trilateral military committee comprising Lebanon, Israel and Unifil will address the 13 disputed points along the border in preparation for formal border demarcation. (Eight of these 13 points were resolved last year before the recent conflicts erupted.) Demarcating the border will be immensely important. For one, it would end Israeli occupation and eliminate Hezbollah’s justification for maintaining weapons under the pretext of resistance. In other words, the resistance narrative will end, along with Hezbollah’s rationale for bearing arms. Over the next three months, Lebanon’s Parliament should elect a president . Then, discussions on a national defence strategy will begin, followed by Hezbollah handing over its weapons to the Lebanese army. This, in a nutshell, is the roadmap for saving Lebanon from destruction and for sparing Hezbollah from annihilation. It is also the roadmap for preventing Israel from occupying Lebanese territory under the pretence of targeting Hezbollah’s missiles and tunnels. Additionally, it is the roadmap for disarming Palestinian factions that claim to resist Israel no Lebanese soil. This is not a matter of optimism or pessimism. It is political realism, which Iran understands well. And this could explain its submission to the idea of taming Hezbollah.