Britain's attempt to straddle two continents has left it in a dilemma

Right now, there are so many puzzles about war and peace in Europe it’s difficult to know where to start. Government ministers, military chiefs and the rest of us as citizens are all asking the same questions.

Can a Ukraine ceasefire hold? Can Europe look after its own security? Will Nato have “less America”, or even “No America”? In Britain that raises another national security question that has bubbled under British diplomacy for centuries. It can be summed up in a phrase: which way are we facing?

The era of the British Empire meant boom times for Victorian west-facing Atlantic seaports and cities – Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow. Nowadays, Britain’s busiest container port is east-facing, Felixstowe, on the North Sea towards Europe. Ever since the end of the empire, successive UK governments have therefore continued to assert that Britain faces both ways, strongly linked geographically and economically with Europe (despite leaving the EU) and also linked in Nato with the US and Canada, and even more widely linked with the diverse countries of the British Commonwealth.

Diplomats used phrases to describe Britain as a “bridge” or even a “telephone exchange” between the US and Europe. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer is trying to keep those links alive. He appears to have both good relations with US President Donald Trump and considerable influence within the EU, despite Brexit.

But three big changes make Britain’s attempt to straddle two continents on different sides of the Atlantic increasingly difficult. First, bluntly, the Trump administration may not be a reliable partner. Mr Trump appears to see the EU in trade terms as both a rival and an annoyance, while the EU remains Britain’s most important trading partner.

Second, the Ukraine war – or the Ukraine peace, if peace becomes possible – potentially could drive a wedge between the interests of Washington in ending the conflict and the interests of European nations in future defence against Russia. Most Europeans see Ukraine not as a foreign war but as Europe’s frontline of defence against Russian expansionism. The idea of the US disengaging from Nato and European defence is shocking to many Europeans.

And third, there is the threat – or reality – of a transatlantic trade war. That would sour economic relationships to such an extent that it could undermine the goodwill and sense of a common threat that underpins Europe’s defence and US relations.

The last thing Mr Starmer wants is to be forced to choose between the US and the EU. The British want to face both ways. That means the Ukraine war and the prospects of a transatlantic tariff war are, as diplomats say, “not helpful”.

Rather than predict the future, however, we may draw conclusions from the past. The US historically has tried to use tariffs for economic advantage before. Both attempts have been disastrous for Americans. In 1890, a Republican Congressman William McKinley introduced tariffs of almost 50 per cent to “protect” the US economy. The economic damage was so great, and tariffs so unpopular that Republicans lost their majority in the House of Representatives with the number of seats they won reduced by nearly half, from 171 to 88.

A few years later, McKinley resurrected his career and became president, but he did not make the tariff mistake again. In the 1930s, during the presidency of another Republican, Herbert Hoover, US tariffs were imposed again. That contributed to the Great Depression. In 1932, the tariff failure led to the election by a landslide of Hoover’s Democratic opponent Franklin D Roosevelt promising “a new deal” to boost the economy.

And now? Is another Republican, Mr Trump, making the same mistake for a third time? We shall see. Next November, a third of the US Senate and all of the House of Representatives face the mid-term elections. If history is our guide, Republican members of Congress should perhaps consider how safe their slender majorities of seats in both Houses of Congress really are. My guess is, not very safe at all.

Yet the British dilemma remains. Every British diplomat wants to have good relations with the US. Every British diplomat wants the UK to have good relations with the EU and to trade freely around the world.

But it doesn’t take any great predictive ability to foresee that in the 21st century, the world is developing into three great trading blocs based on the US, the EU and China. India is also rising fast while Russia – whatever the outcome of the Ukraine war – is continuing its economic decline.

The Russian economy is boosted by Mr Trump's peace efforts but remains smaller than Italy’s. British diplomats are therefore preoccupied with being close to Mr Trump while also strong in Europe. Perhaps we need a new metaphor. Britain is not a “telephone exchange” or a “bridge”. Britain is a middle-ranking power balancing on a tightrope, and balance is everything.