In a landmark announcement on May 12, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) declared it would dissolve and cease its four-decade-long armed conflict with Turkey. If implemented, this will be remembered as a watershed moment in a conflict that has claimed thousands of lives and expanded well beyond Turkey’s borders, into neighbouring Iraq and Syria. An end to the fighting between the Turkish state and the PKK could create opportunities to address the longstanding grievances of Turkey’s Kurdish population while reducing the threat of additional conflict in a fragile region. But despite these promising developments, obstacles may remain on the path to achieving a permanent peace settlement.
Since its insurgency began in 1984, the PKK (officially listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and the EU) has been considered by Ankara as its primary national security threat. The Turkish state has attempted to address this threat through talks and, more commonly, through military might. When the most recent ceasefire in the Turkey-PKK conflict collapsed in mid-2015, it triggered widespread deadly violence that expanded into northern Iraq and northern Syria, drawing additional parties into the conflict. In the years since, the conflict has been marked by alternating periods of intense and reduced violence, leaving even close observers of the situation with the impression that a peaceful resolution remains distant.
When Turkey signalled openness towards the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, the group’s founder and leader who has been imprisoned in Turkey since his capture in 1999 and who has legendary status in the group, played an instrumental role. In a historic announcement last February, Ocalan formally called for the PKK to lay down its weapons. He stated that the PKK's armed struggle for either a separate nation-state or even administrative autonomy is no longer relevant, effectively removing the organisation's fundamental purpose. Ocalan emphasised that an alternative path for achieving its goals now exists through political participation within the existing states in which Kurds live. He instructed the PKK leadership based in northern Iraq's Qandil mountains to officially disband the organisation. Within two days of the announcement, the PKK had responded declaring a unilateral ceasefire, and three months later, the leadership complied with Ocalan’s directive to publicly dissolve itself.
This was not a sudden change of heart. Rather, years of quiet backchannelling have culminated in what appears to be this surprising development. Although Turkey had maintained a vocal and often hawkish public stance against the PKK, behind closed doors Turkish officials repeatedly acknowledged that no military solution to this conflict existed and that negotiations would eventually be necessary. Still, Ankara insisted that achieving a stronger military position must precede any such talks. Public discussion about a potential political process became increasingly toxic due to the threat of attacks and character assassination from hardline voices across the political spectrum.
What distinguished this initiative from previous attempts was the unexpected support from traditionally hardline figures. This became clear when Devlet Bahceli, who leads Turkey’s right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and serves as a crucial partner in President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s governing coalition, publicly shook hands with representatives of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) during a parliamentary session last October. This gesture marked an unprecedented show of goodwill from Mr Bahceli, who had previously been opposed to any political resolution. Mr Bahceli’s public gesture and later statements allowed Mr Erdogan to quietly build momentum for the political process without risking political backlash, as he wasn't directly leading these initial overtures.
But the question remains: why has Ankara chosen to advance talks with the PKK at this particular moment? Recent years have shown that despite Turkey’s growing military advantage, its campaign against the PKK has created significant political and strategic challenges. Militarily, Turkey has strengthened its position through expanded drone capabilities, improved intelligence gathering and targeted strikes on previously inaccessible PKK mountain strongholds. However, this conflict has consumed valuable resources from Turkey’s struggling economy. Moreover, it has periodically strained Ankara's relationships with western allies and with Baghdad, which has repeatedly objected to Turkish operations on PKK positions in Iraq and growing number of Turkish outposts on Iraqi soil. And more importantly for Ankara, it viewed the conflict as creating security vulnerabilities that regional rivals such as Iran, Russia or Israel might exploit to their advantage.
From the PKK's perspective, they appear to have come to the view that a political solution could yield better results for their cause than continued armed struggle. That said, the Kurdish leadership says Turkey must now take steps for the process to move along. They have floated specific preconditions for disarmament, including the Turkish military completely ceasing all operations against PKK forces, and that the peace process receive a formal legal recognition through parliamentary legislation as a first step towards a more comprehensive process.
For its part, Ankara has been carefully avoiding any characterisation of this as a quid pro quo offering concessions to the PKK in exchange for disbanding. Turkish officials insist the PKK must disband unilaterally, without preconditions. Nevertheless, Turkey is still expected to make significant moves to respond to some of the PKK’s demands. These would likely fall into two categories: immediate tactical measures and mid- to long-term strategic changes. The immediate concessions might include amnesties for PKK members, releasing some imprisoned PKK members as well as DEM Party politicians, and potentially improving conditions for Ocalan through either house arrest or enhanced prison visitation rights. The more substantial strategic concessions would involve implementing political reforms and strengthening rights for Turkey’s Kurdish population. To date, Ankara has not taken concrete steps toward implementing such measures.
Another key question concerns the impact of this process on the Syrian affiliate of the PKK, which constitutes the main fighting force of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlling northeastern Syria. The SDF has publicly endorsed all PKK initiatives while privately emphasising that disarmament demands do not apply to their forces, given Syria's fundamentally different political landscape amid its fragile transition. If PKK demobilisation moves forward, Turkey will likely demand that, at a minimum, non-Syrian PKK-affiliated fighters withdraw from SDF ranks. In return, Ankara might pledge not to attack SDF forces directly or through Syrian proxy militias and could indicate to Damascus its willingness to tolerate a form of SDF presence in northeastern Syria – one that falls short of a federal state structure, which both Ankara and Damascus firmly reject.
While all these challenges ahead may seem daunting, an end to this conflict is within reach. This is not just an opportunity for Turkey to redefine its national security landscape but also to close a chapter on over forty years of conflict.
