The newly released US National Security Strategy deserves close reading, even if President Donald Trump – through his personality, temperament and improvisational style – has become the embodiment of his government’s national security doctrine, written or otherwise.
The vision of Mr Trump’s second administration for America’s global role isn’t the same as that of his first, and the contents of the current strategy have angered allies and prompted new friends to diversify their relationships rather than rely exclusively on the American partner.
What’s useful for understanding this doctrine is its unapologetic clarity. Indeed, it emphasises US power not by expanding global leadership but by downsizing it, and by refraining from managing the world order, as was done in the past. This is a fundamental shift in how Washington views its global role and how it defines its national interest.
The slogan “America First” and the mantra “Make America Great Again” are fleshed out in the global strategy from the standpoint of protecting US sovereignty and avoiding international commitments that do not serve Washington directly. Priority is given to reinforcing the domestic home front economically, technologically and in terms of security.
The NSS calls for a departure from wide-scale US military deployment and a turn towards what it calls “smart deterrence” and defence modernisation, with a reduction in traditional military obligations outside the Americas.
The US under the NSS shows little concern for notions such as a “unipolar” or “multipolar” world. While Mr Trump’s first administration adopted a strategy of confronting Russia and aggressively competing with China, the second-term strategy appears largely indifferent to head-on confrontations with either power. Instead, it focuses on avoiding major wars and prefers to contain adversaries.
The Trump administration thus wants to encircle China and limit its strategic expansion without pursuing open confrontation or regime change. The administration wants to bleed Russia if it insists on continuing the war in Ukraine, keeping it in the category of a weakened rival incapable of imposing new realities in Europe or the Middle East. In other words, the NSS’s focus is crisis management, not absolute resolution.
The new strategy reflects Washington’s conviction that today’s global tools are no longer hard power but AI, cybersecurity, energy and deal-making. It outlines a path for maintaining global primacy without asserting domination. The priority is realpolitik in defence of American interests. To be clear, the US no longer feels compelled to prove its exceptional greatness, because it already considers itself great.
In its geographic reordering of priorities, the NSS places great emphasis on North and South America. It’s heavily focused on border security, immigration, economic influence and tackling organised crime and drug trafficking in Latin America. Next in priority is the Indo-Pacific, where economic and technological competition with China takes precedence over traditional military rivalry.
What the 2025 NSS document says about relations with Europe has deeply upset America’s allies on the continent. It makes a clear demand that they take on greater responsibility, while the US retreats from its default role as Nato leader. However, the NSS isn’t aimed at diminishing Europe’s role; rather, it calls for more pragmatic relationships with fewer long-term obligations.
It states that co-operation with other countries will be based on American interest, followed by mutual benefit only – not on shared alliances, values or ideals. It asserts that both European and Asian allies will have to bear the cost of their own security. The NSS favours conditional co-operation over permanent commitment and doesn’t shy away from speaking the language of money as the foundation of foreign policy.
This strategy also redefines the US role in the world by drawing down its traditional security involvement in Europe and the Middle East. Consequently, the traditional US engagement in the Middle East will shrink, except in vital roles that serve America’s direct strategic interests.
This doesn’t imply a rollback of Mr Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan for Gaza, nor of the hoped-for Abraham Accords normalising ties between Arab states and Israel. It doesn’t mean abandoning political or security initiatives or disregarding strategic waterways and energy flows. Co-operation with regional states will continue, particularly in the pursuit of stability and intelligence co-ordination to fight terrorism.
But the NSS makes clear that US engagement won’t be grounded in long-term institutional commitments. That is, modern and targeted deterrence will take precedence over permanent military deployments or long-standing partnership structures in the Middle East.
This doesn’t mean the US will abandon the Middle East altogether, but rather that the approach will change based on selective methods and direct interest. For their part, it is likely America’s Arab partners will continue to diversify their alliances while maintaining a privileged security relationship with Washington.
Iran will remain under a regime of containment and pressure economically and in terms of security. Meanwhile, Washington is trying to persuade Tehran that it is in its interest to revise its nuclear, missile and regional proxy doctrines while the door for a deal remains open. It would prefer not to resort to military action against Iran but won’t hesitate to do so if provoked. It views the cost of containment as less than the cost of regional conflagration. Yet there will be no compromise on the nuclear issue, nor tolerance for Iran’s use of proxies to destabilise the region.
Israel, according to the new global strategy, remains central. But it is the US that retains the decisive role in managing Israel’s behaviour. Washington’s commitment to Israel’s security is absolute. However, it won’t tolerate Israeli recklessness that could entangle the US.
American diplomatic forward-planning thus wants to avoid flaunting military might. Yet US global retrenchment may be only tactical especially as there is no sign of withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere. The strategy of building flexible alliance networks aligns with US interests as Mr Trump sees them. Letting regional partners take part in solving local crises is encouraged, but on the condition that Washington remains the ultimate arbiter in moments of decision.
The US isn’t about to relinquish global leadership. Rather, it’s adopting a method that avoids heavy field entanglements while keeping its presence effective, in the shadows when Washington sees fit, and in the spotlight when it chooses.
